Original	paper	UDC	16+168(045) doi:	10.21464/sp32212 Received:	June	9,	2016 Gabriel Tȃrziu University	of	Bucharest,	Institute	for	Research	in	Humanities,	1	Dimitrie	Brandza	St.,	RO–060102	Bucharest gabi_tarziu@yahoo.com Social Constructivism and Methodology of Science Abstract Scientific practice is a type of social practice, and every enterprise of knowledge in general exhibits important social dimensions. But should the fact that scientific practice is born out of and tied to the collaborative efforts of the members of a social group be taken to affect the products of these practices as well? In this paper, I will try in to give an affirmative answer to this question. My strategy will be to argue that the aim of science is partially determined by a socio-historical context and that this aim, together with the available background knowledge, stands behind a methodology that is responsible for empirically and aim-adequate theoretical results. Keywords social	constructivism,	the	aim	of	science,	scientific	realism,	the	commercialization	of	research,	scientific	methodology 1. Values, interests and social constructions Scientific	practice	is	a	social	practice,	and	every	enterprise	of	knowledge	in general exhibits important social dimensions. But should the fact that the scientific	practice is	born	out	of	and tied to the	collaborative	efforts	of the members	of	a	social	group	be	taken	to	affect	the	products	of	these	practices as	well?	Should	we	understand	the	content	of	science	as	being	dependent	and tied	to the	contingent	facts	about the	social	group	in	which	it is	produced? Those	who	believe	that	we	should	do	this	usually	opt	for	replacing "...	the	view that	observation	and	experiment	play the	dominant role in the specification	of scientific	facts	with	the	view	that	these	processes	involve	collective	negotiations,	interests	and the infusion	of	experimental	outcomes	with	contingent	features	of	situations."	(Knorr-Cetina 1993,	p.	556) Thus,	they	opt	for	a	social	account	of	the	content	of	science.	These	are	the social	constructivists. 1.1. A social constructivism interlude According	to	social	constructivists,	science	should	be	understood	as	embedded	within	a	certain	socio-cultural	context that	determines its features.	Regarding	science	this	way	usually	involves	the	following	considerations: A. Metaphysical considerations – the objects of science are not to be found in	nature,	but	are	built	by the	scientific	community	(i.e.	by	a group of people organized in a certain way and pursuing a certain practice),	and	exhibit	particular	values,	interests	and	needs	that	their SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science450 creators	had	at	the	moment	of	their	creation.	This	means	that	"if	scientists	had	chosen	to	confer	facthood	otherwise	than	they	actually	did, then	subsequent	history	would	reflect	this	in	a	world-view	consistent with	the	choice	they	counterfactually	made"	(Nelson	1994,	p.	541). B. Epistemological considerations	– the	abovementioned	metaphysical position	goes	well	with	a	social	dependence	conception	of	knowledge, according	to	which	knowledge	is	relative	and	should	be	analyzed	in terms	of	the	historical	and	cultural	contexts	that	the	knowledge	producer	occupies.	Since	there	are	no	context-free	or	super-cultural	vantage points from which to evaluate different ways of knowing the world,	we	cannot	do	better	but	to	take	them	as	equally	valid.	"Firstworld	science	is	one	science	among	many;	by	claiming	to	be	more	it chases	to	be	an	instrument	of	research	and	turns	into	a	(political)	pressure	group."	(Feyerabend	1993,	p.	3) The	idea	behind	these	two	types	of	considerations	is	that	the	connection	between	society	and	our	knowledge	of	the	world	should	not	be	treated	lightly. Social	and	cultural	contexts	are	considerably	more	important	than	it	was	previously	presupposed.	Social	constructivists	push	this	relation	beyond,	by	now trivial,	common	acceptance	that	science	has	a	social	dimension,	i.e.	that	it	is a	social	practice	pursued	collaboratively	by	members	of	a	social	group	which can	be	influenced	in	their	work	by	certain	economic,	political	or	social	values. This	influence	can	explain,	for	example,	why	a	certain	scientific	community is	more	interested	in	certain	problems	than	others	or	why	a	scientist	formulated	a	certain	theoretical	conjecture.	What	the	constructivists	are	claiming	is not	that	these	values	influence	the	practice	of	science,	but	that	they	are	affecting	(to	be	read	constructing)	the	very	content	of	science. Writing about the instrumental manufacture of knowledge in the lab, K. Knorr-Cetina,	for	example,	argues	that "...	the	products	of	science	are	contextually	specific	instructions	which	bear	the	mark	of	the situational	contingency	and	interest	structure	of	the	processes	by	which	they	are	generated,	and which	cannot	be	adequately	understood	without	an	analysis	of	their	construction."	(Knorr-Cetina	1981,	p.	5) Thus, scientific objects and/or scientific knowledge are constructed. But what	does	it	mean	to	say	that	something	is	socially	constructed?	What	do	the constructivists	have	in	mind	when	they	are	claiming	that	science	is	socially constructed?	The	first	answer that	comes to	our	mind is that	science is the product	of social	practices.	This can	be	understood in two	ways.	First,	we can	understand	this	dependence	in	terms	of	social	requirements	necessary	for science.	Science	cannot	obtain	in	isolation.	It	needs	collaborative	efforts	of the	members	of	a	social	group	living	in	a	society	with	a	certain	structure,	and in the	context	of	certain	political	and	economic	conditions.	Since	these	are necessary	conditions	for	the	appearance	of	science,	we	can	say	that	science is	a	social	construction.	But	this	is	trivial	and	in	agreement	with	the	classical view	about	science:	it	amounts	to	nothing	more	than	saying	about	scientific practice	that	it	is	socially	constituted. Second of all, we can understand this claim in contrast with the idea that something	is	discovered.	When	the	social	constructivists	are	saying	that	science is a constructive	activity,	what they	have in	mind is that the	work	of scientists	actually	brings	into	existence	their	domain	of	study	and	that	their creative	activity	is	guided	and	determined	by	the	social,	economic,	political values,	needs,	and	interests. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science451 To	better	understand	what	the	constructivists	have	in	mind	when	they	speak of	social	constructions, let's look	at the following	example:	gendered individuals	are	social	constructions.	To	say	that	gender is	a	social	construction is	to	say	that	our	society	constructed	the	concept	of	gender	and	made	gender classifications	based	on	this	concept.	Subsequently,	those	to	whom	this	classification	was	forced	upon	started	to	behave	in	accordance	with	the	classification,	exhibiting	the	very	properties	that	the	classification	attributed	them.	This results	in	a	type	of	thing	that	wouldn't	have	existed	in	the	absence	of	certain social	creation	processes,	or	if	the	values	or	interests	that	stood	behind	these processes	were	different.	Two	things	should	be	noted	about	these	products	of social	practices:	they	are	context	dependent	and	value-interest1	impregnated. They	are	context	dependent	because	they	would	not	have	existed	under	different	(social)	circumstances.	They	are	value-interest	impregnated	in	the	sense that	they	are	analyzable	in	terms	of	the	specific	values	and	interests	that	stood behind	and	determined	their	apparition. As	our	example	shows,	it	is	relatively	easy	to	see	how	this	view	about	social construction	could	work	in	theories	about	gender,	race,	sexuality,	emotions, class,	etc.	Things	get	really	complicated,	though,	when	we	try	to	apply	this view	to	science,	and	say	that	the	scientific	objects	are	social	constructions. We	will	not	pursue	further	the	issue	of	the	way	we	can	reconceptualize	the	objects	of	science	as	social	constructions	because	this	will	distract	us	too	much from	our	aim.	Suffice	to	say	that	there	are	several	accounts	of	the	construction processes	in	the	literature	and	that	what	they	have	in	common	is	that	they	attribute	to	the	objects	resulted	as	products	of	the	construction	the	two	characteristics	noted	above:	context	dependence	and	value-interest	impregnation. The	common	picture	is	that	the	processes	in	which	scientific	objects	are	generated	can	be	spelled	out	in	terms	of	negotiations	and	decisions,	and	behind this	we	can	find	social	values,	interests	and	needs.	Products	of	science	are	decision-laden	and	these	decisions	are	in	turn	value/interest-laden.	This	brings to	our	attention	the	following	problem:	the	role	of	values	in	science.	An	interesting	way	to	look	at	the	social-constructivism	issue	is	to	approach	it	by looking	to	see	if	values	play	such	a	crucial	role	in	science. 1.2. The role of values in science Classical	view	about the	role	of	values in	science is	categorical:	science is value-free.	This	can	be	found	already	in	Galileo's	discussion	about	"the	facts of	Nature,	which	remain	death	and	inexorable	to	our	wishes"	(Galileo	1957, p. 270), but it is mastered by logical empiricists who contrasted scientific judgments	with	value	judgments	which	represent	subjective	phenomena	not open	to	rational	appraisal	and	thus	lacking	truth	value,	and,	moreso,	are	not assertable	in	a	meaningful	statement	at	all	(Carnap	1959,	p.	77).	Our	scientific decisions	are	not	value-laden	from	this	perspective: "The	grounds	on	which	scientific	hypothesis	are	accepted	or	rejected	are	provided	by	empirical evidence,	which	may	include	observational	findings	as	well	as	previously	established	laws	and theories,	but	surely	no	value-judgments."	(Hempel	1965,	p.	91) 1 I	use	value	and	interest	here	somewhat	interchangeably.	This	will allow	me to recast, in the	next section,	at least	a	part	of the	social constructivism	issue	in	terms	of	the	problem of	values	in	science.	The	idea	here	is	that	we value what we are interested in and we are interested in those things that we value the most.	So,	we	can	take	interests	as	being	nothing more than a way of thinking about the way	we	pursue	values. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science452 Values	can	figure	only	in	the	context	of	discovery,	but	the	part	of	scientific practice	that	is	epistemologically	relevant	is	the	context	of	justification.	From this perspective, science is a neutral, impartial and autonomous discipline whose	aim	is	to	represent	the	world	as	it	is	without	contaminating	it	with	our preferences,	needs	and	interests.	As	it	is	well	known,	this	view	came	under a	powerful	attack.	First,	the	distinction	between	fact	and	value	was	rejected starting	from	Quine's	work	(in	particular	his	holism).2	Secondly,	Kuhn	emphasized	the	pragmatic	factors	in	theory	choice. How	does	this	relate	to	our	previous	discussion	about	social	constructivism? In	two	ways:	one	in	favor	of	social	constructivism,	and	one	against	it. First,	Thomas	Kuhn	is	usually	pointed	out	as	the	main	source	of	inspiration for	constructivism.	If	theory	choice	is	not	determined	by	rational	considerations,	what	else	determines	it?	A	choice	will	be	the	values,	interests	and	needs that	drive	any	other	social	decision.	This	opened	the	door	for	a	social	account of	the	content	of	science.	The	second	way	this	discussion	bears	on	our	previous	discussion	is	that	it	is	pointing	us	in	the	direction	of	an	argument	against social	constructivism.	The	idea	here is that	of	distinguishing	between	epistemic	values	and	social	values	and	to	take	scientific	decision	making	as	based on	the	first	kind	of	values. If	we	interpret	their	position	in	terms	of	values,	social	constructivists	seem	to be	committed	to	the	following	thesis:	the	scientific	practice	is	not	fully	and essentially	determined	by	its	own	values	(we	can	name	this	the	flow	of	values thesis)3.	This	can	happen	for	two	reasons:	either	there	are	no	values	specific	to the	scientific	practice	(the	strong	thesis),	or	there	are	such	values	but	they	are overridden	by	social	values,	needs	and	interests	(the	weak	thesis).	Do	these theses	make	sense? In	its	strong	form,	the	thesis	seems	to	imply	that	we	don't	have	different	social practices	with	their	own	values	and	goals.	What	it	is	at	work	in	science,	as	it	is in	other	social	practices,	are	economic,	political	and	social	interests.	But	this seems	at	least	implausible,	and	not	just	for	the	case	of	science. The	first	thing	we	can	observe	about	the	weak	form	of	the	flow	of	values	thesis is	that	it	can	be	easily	transformed	into	its	strong	counterpart.	All	we	need	is	to deny	that	social	values	can	enter	scientific	decision	making	without	affecting the	values	that	define	science	as	an	independent	social	practice.	But	let's	say that	this	is	possible	–	what	the	weak	thesis	implies	is	that	social	values	contaminate	scientific	decision	making	and	so	change	the	whole	outcome	of	scientific	practice.	This	is	highly	controversial,	though.	We	normally	see	science as comprising those social	practices aimed	at the	knowledge	of the	world, hence	at	truth,	and	we	take	the	values	that	shape	these	practices	as	securing the	chances	of	attaining	this	goal.	Of	course	that	the	members	of	the	scientific community	bring	with	them	certain	political,	economic,	and	social	values	that influence	in	certain	respects	how	they	pursue	their	work	but,	normally,	these are	either	overridden	by	the	epistemic	values	of	the	community	or	they	don't interfere	with	the	latter	(for	example	if	the	social	values	manifest	themselves in	the	choice	of	scientific	problems	and	the	direction	of	scientific	research). This	doesn't	mean	that	the	path	to	truth,	which	is	supposedly	secured	by	the epistemic	values	found	in	science,	is	not	easily	distortable.	It	means	only	that there	are	such	values	and	they	shape	the	scientific	practice. There	is	another	way,	though,	for	the	social	constructivists	to	argue	for	their doctrine,	which	may	not	seem	to	be	so	problematic.	This time, their target is	not	the	values	but	the	goal	that	those	values	are	supposed	to	improve	the SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science453 chances	of attaining. Is the	goal	of science really	knowledge?	What I	will try	to	do4	in	the	next	sections	is	to	show	that	this	view	about	science's	aim	is problematic. 2. Science and society "Science	does	not	stand	outside	of	society	dispensing	its	gifts	of	knowledge	and	wisdom;	neither is	it	an	autonomous	enclave	that	is	now	being	crushed	under	the	weight	of	narrowly	commercial or	political	interests."	(Gibbons	et	al.	1994,	p.	22) Science	is	resource	dependent.	Besides the	time	and	energy	of	researchers, it	needs	a large	amount	of finances to	cover	all the	costs	generated	by the research	processes:	starting	from	laboratory	equipment	to	the	salaries.	Now, where	does	science	gets	this	money	from?	This	is	an	important	question	because	it	is	not	hard	to	realize	that,	whoever	controls	resources,	controls	science;5	and	through	money	are injected	into the	system	the	funders'	values: their	tastes,	needs,	ethics,	etc.	The	biggest	and	oldest	sponsor	is	society	as	a whole,	but	recently	there	are	other	parties	joining	in.	There	are	interest	groups that invest in	science through	their	own	research	foundations	and	there	are firms	that	develop	in-house	research	programs	or	provide	funds	for	external ones. Is scientific knowledge affected by this resource dependency of science? There	is	no	straightforward	answer	to	this	question.	What	we	can	say	with certainty	is	only	that	the	production	of	scientific	knowledge	is	sensitive	to this	dependency.	Actually,	there	are	recent	sociological	studies	that	draw	our attention	to	the	recent	transformations	of	the	nature	of	the	research	process that takes place in our society as a result of the commercialization of research. 2.1. The commercialization of research In	recent	sociology	studies6	we	can	notice	a	growing	interest	towards	a	very interesting	phenomenon	which	seems	to	take	the	aspect	of	a	true	revolution: the	transformation	of	the	old	paradigm	of	scientific	research	into	a	new	mode of	knowledge	production.	According	to	the	main	researchers7	who	have	drawn the	attention	upon	this	phenomenon,	the	revolution	consists	in	passing	from 2 See	for	example	Putnam:	"without	values	we don't	have	a	world"	(Putnam	1990,	p.	141). 3 If everything revolves around social interests	and is	oriented to social	goals, then the social values flow throughout every human practice. 4 Actually, I'm sketching only the outlines of an	argument	because	filling	in	the	details	(examples,	details	of	different	positions,	extended counterargument and historical support) would have inflated the paper to undesired proportions. 5 In	the	words	of	an	electrical	engineering	department's	chair:	"You	have	to	accept	the	fact that	it	[research]	is	going	to	be	driven	by	the people	who	give	you	the	money.	[If]	the	state gives	us	money, they	tell	us	what to	do.	[If] NSF gives us the money, they tell us what research they want done. [If] DoD gives us the	money,	[its]	the	government	...	Why	is	it any different with industry? I see no difference	whatsoever."	(in	Slaughter	et	al.,	2004, p.	135) 6 See for example Scott (1999), Finnegan (2005),	Sörlin	and	Vessuri	(2007), Viale	and Roselli	(2010). 7 Gibbons	et	al.	(1994);	Nowotny	et	al.	(2001). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science454 Mode	1	science	–	homogeneous,	built	on theory,	autonomous	and	disinterested	–	to	Mode	2	knowledge	production	–	trans-disciplinary,	contextualized, oriented	towards	applications	and	receptive	to	certain	external	factors	such	as sociological	problems	and	industrial	priorities. In	this	context	we	can	notice	a	breaking	down	of	the	boundaries	between	university,	industry	and	governments.8 "The	university	takes	the	role	of	industry	by	stimulating	the	development	of	new	firms	from research, introducing 'the capitalization of knowledge' as an academic goal. Firms develop training to ever higher levels and share knowledge through joint ventures, acting a bit like universities. Governments act as public venture capitalists while continuing their regulatory activities."	(Etzkowitz	2008,	p.	1) The	new	entrepreneurial	science	assumes	as	a	core	value	the	participation	in the	process	of	economic	development	and	becomes	a	veritable	economic	actor	committed	to	making	money. The	outcome	of	these	transformations	is	that	knowledge	becomes	valued	in terms	of	the	profit-potential	that	it	has	on	the	market.	It	is	no	longer	a	public	good,	but	an	"intellectual	property"	which	can	be	commercialized	as	any other	goods	and	services.	This	changes	completely	not	only	the	way	scientists view	the	results	of	their	activity,	but	also	the	very	nature	of	this	activity	as they	tend	and	are	stimulated	to	become	more	focused	on	the	socio-economic aspect	of	their	research:	scientific	research	has	become	–	under	these	circumstances	–	a	socio-economic	enterprise.9 How	does	this	recently	assumed	function	affects	the	other	roles	of	scientific research?	What	we	know	for	sure	is	that	it	can	change	completely	the	choice of	scientific	problems.	But	does	it	interfere	with	the	epistemological	function of	science? 2.2. Truth, adequacy, profit... The	new	process	of	knowledge	production	depicted	in	the	last	section	suggests	an	interesting	way	to	argue	for	a	social	constructivist	view	on	science.	In order	to	see	this,	we	need	to	make	a	short	detour	to	look	at	the	dispute	between scientific	realists	and	their	opponents. What	is	scientific	realism?	This	is	a	difficult	question	since	the	philosophical literature	comprises	a	whole	galaxy	of	doctrines	that	can	be	placed	under	this label.	A	way	to	order	this	variety	of	realist	views	is	on	the	basis	of	the	theses that	are	taken	to	best	characterize	them.	We	can	distinguish	between	the	following	realist	theses: A. The ontological thesis – expresses the scientific realist's belief that most	of the	unobservable	entities	postulated in	a (mature)	scientific context	populate	the	world	as	well	as	observable	objects	do. B. The semantic thesis	–	takes	the	theoretical	claims	about	the	unobservables	as	being,	as	well	as	those	about	observables,	truth-conditioned descriptions	of	an	independent	reality. C. The epistemological thesis	–	is	making	explicit	the	trust	that	scientific theories are our best sources of knowledge about the whole world: observable	and	unobservable. D. The axiological thesis	–	presents	science	as	aiming	at	true	theories. Most	scientific	realists	prefer	to	present	their	position	as	a	research	program comprising	several	of	these	theses	(usually	the	first	three),	but	there	are	phiSYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science455 losophers	who	choose	only	one	of	them	as	constitutive	for	the	central	aspects of	their	view. Let's	focus	on	the	realist	view	expressed	with	the	help	of	the	axiological	thesis. Between	those	who	choose	to	see	realism	in	an	axiological	light	is	Bas	van	Fraassen.	He	takes	the	following	to	be	the	correct	statement	of	scientific	realism: S.R.:	"Science	aims	to	give	us,	in	its	theories,	a	literally	true	story	of	what the	world	is	like;	and	acceptance	of	a	scientific	theory	involves	the	belief that	it	is	true."	(van	Fraassen	1980,	p.	8) To	this,	he	opposes	the	following	anti-realist	position: C.E.:	"Science	aims	to	give	us	theories	which	are	empirically	adequate; and	acceptance	of	a	theory	involves	as	belief	only	that	it	is	empirically adequate."	(van	Fraassen	1980,	p.	12) Does	what	we	have	said	above	about	the	production	of	scientific	knowledge influence	in	any	way	the	debate	between	scientific	realists	and	anti-realists as	it	is	cast	in	van	Fraassen's	terms?	It	surely	does	seem	so.	To	see	this,	let's reformulate the above realist axiological thesis by taking into account the discussion	from	our	previous	section	about	the	capitalization	of	knowledge. We	have	the	following	thesis: C.K.R: Science aims to give us market competitive and social relevant results, and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. At	first	sight,	the	first	part	doesn't	seem	to	be	compatible	with	what	follows. After	all,	what	has	market	competitiveness	to	do	with	truth?	If	anything, it seems	to	stand	in	the	way	of	uninterested,	autonomous,	and	objective	truth seeking	activities.	Besides,	if	you	don't	search	for	something,	what	chances do	you	have	of	finding	it?	If	our	current	science	turned	its	interest	away	from truth,	can	we	still	find	it	between	the	scientific	results?	An	affirmative	answer to	this	question	would	presuppose	an	exaggerated	view	about	the	constraints that	the	world	imposes	upon	our	theoretic	activities.	Should	we	then	reformulate	the	second	part	of	this	thesis	along	the	lines	traced	by	the	above	anti-realist	position?	Does	the	following	thesis	make	more	sense? C.K.E: Science aims to give us market competitive and social relevant results; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. 8 This	phenomenon	is	usually	referred	to	as	the triple	helix:	"As	these	three	institutional	sectors	(public,	private	and	academic)	interact,	a spiral	pattern	of linkages	emerges	at	various stages	of	the	innovation	process"	(Etzkowitz 2002,	p.	139). 9 Not everyone sees these things in the same colors.	Etzkowitz,	for	example,	takes	the	universities'	assumption	of	economic	and	social missions	as	an	extension	and	normal	continuation	of	its	previous	functions	of	teaching	and research:	"The	first	academic	mission	of	education implies a second mission of research that in turn propels a third mission of economic and social development" (Etzkowitz 2008, p. 30). See also Viale and Rosselli: "Academic	communities	are	fearful	that	capitalization	will	diminish	the	university	goal	of knowledge	production	per se.	This	fear	seems to	be	linked	to	a	traditional	image	of	the	division	of	labor	in	universities.	Curiosity-driven research	is	separated	from	technology-driven research. Therefore, if a university focuses on the latter, it handicaps and weakens the former. On the contrary, in our opinion, in many	technological	fields	knowledge	production	simultaneously	encompasses	various	aspects	of	research"	(Viale	and	Rosselli	2010,	p. 3).	My	reasons	for	not	adopting	this	approach will	be	exposed	in	the	next	section. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science456 Settling	for	this	second	position	only	on	the	basis	of	what	we	have	said	so	far would	be,	of	course,	too	hasty.	Someone	can	object,	for	example,	that	C.K.R would	make	more	sense	if	we	add,	as	we	should	have	done	in	the	first	place, the	search	for	knowledge	as	the	primary	aim	of	science.	The	capitalization	of knowledge	doesn't	replace	the	original	aim	of	science,	but	adds	to	it,	transforms	it.	After	all,	what	gets	used	as	a	marketable	product	or	a	means	to	to solve	social	problems	are	the	results	obtained	by	science	from	its	knowledge seeking	activities.	The	old	(main)	aim	of	science	is	retained,	what	changes	is the	way	this	aim	is	taken.	Knowledge	no	longer	represents	a	goal	in	itself,	but a	resource	valued	for	its	utility	in	and	relevance	for	extra-scientific	contexts. But	putting	scientific	knowledge	to	work,	exploiting	it	for	its	socio-economic implications	doesn't	mean	abandoning	it	as	an	aim.	Thus,	this	thesis	should look	like	this: C.K.*R: Science aims [mostly] at market competitive and social relevant knowledge of the world; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. As	in	the	realist	position	(S.R.	above),	the	aim	here	is	truth,	and	we	no	longer have	any	compatibility	issues	between	the	first	part	and	the	rest	of	this	thesis. What	is	different	in	C.K.*R is	the	type	of	knowledge	science	is	after:	instead of	knowledge	for	knowledge's	sake,	we	have	knowledge	for	benefit.	The	capitalization	of	knowledge	makes	science	more	sensitive	to,	and	more	concerned with	what	can	be	done	with	its	results,	but	it	doesn't	take	it	out	of	the	truth seeking	business, so	we	don't	need to	abandon	a realist	position	and	adopt some	sort	of	empiricism	(C.K.E thesis	above)	just	because	of	it.	Or	do	we? Unfortunately for the scientific realist, things are not that simple. If truthseeking	would	have	not	been	such	an	opaque	and	mysterious	process,	so	that we	could	say	easily	what	counts	as	a	good	method	for	finding	it	and	what	not, the	realist	would	have	been	in	a	much	better	position,	but	things	are	far	from simple	when	we	take	into	consideration	scientific	truth	(the	anti-realists	offer	us	plenty	of	reasons	for	doubting	that	we	can	struck	truth	in	our	scientific endeavors). 2.3. Methods and aims Can	we	say	with	certainty	that	the	scientific	methodology	represents	a	reliable tool	for	arriving	at	approximately	true	theories	about	the	world,	or	do	we	have to	accept	that	all	we	can	get	from	it	is	empirically	adequate	theories?	Richard Boyd	offers	a	realist	answer	to	this	question.	He	takes	as	a	starting	point	in	his argument	the	instrumental	reliability	of	scientific	methodology	and	points	to	a realistic	account	of	scientific	theories	as	being	the	only	scientifically	plausible explanation	for	it.	We	can	reconstruct	his	argument	this	way: (i) Nobody	denies	the	fact	that	we	have	instrumentally	reliable	theories, i.e.	theories	that	are	empirically	adequate	(or	that	save	the	phenomena	in	van	Fraassen's	words). (ii) We	arrived	at	these	theories	by	using	a	certain	scientific	methodology. (iii) But the principles that stand behind this methodology are theoryladen. (iv) We	know	that,	so	far,	this	scientific	methodology	is	very	successful in	providing	us	with	increasingly	good	predictive	theories. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science457 (v) From	(i)	and	(iv)	we	can	say	that	our	methodology	is	instrumentally reliable. (vi) But,	in	order	to	have	an	explanation	for	(v),	keeping	in	mind	what	we have	said	at	(iii),	we	have	to	accept	that	our	scientific	theories	–	the same	ones	that	are	behind	and	lead	to	improvements	in	methodology –	are	more than	empirically	adequate, that they	are	approximately true.	In	Boyd's	words:	"A	satisfactory	naturalistic	answer	regarding the	instrumental	reliability	of	each	of these	methodological	principles10 is available if	one	assumes that they	apply in a situation in which the	relevant	background	theories	are	approximately true	[as well	as	instrumentally	reliable]."	(Boyd	1980,	p.	621) C:	Our	scientific	theories	are	not	only	empirically	adequate;	they	are	approximately	true.	Thus,	what	we	have	in	science,	in	Boyd's	view,	is	a	sort of	dialectical	process: "Our	methodology,	based	on	approximately	true	theories,	would	be	a	reliable	guide	to	the	discovery	of	new	results	and	the	improvement	of	older	theories.	The	resulting	improvements	in	our knowledge	of	the	world	would	result	in	a	still	more	reliable	methodology	leading	to	still	more accurate	theories,	and	so	on."	(Boyd	1983,	p.	65) Can	we	recast	Boyd's	argument	in	a	context	similar	to	that	of	the	capitalization	of	knowledge?	I	think	not.	If	we	take	into	consideration	the	change	of goal	that	accompanies	the	new	mode	of	knowledge	production,	we	have	good reasons	to	suspect	that	the	dialectical	process,	that	represents	the	core	of	science	in	Boyd's	view,	fails.	In	this	context,	we	can	no	longer	speak	about	new theoretical knowledge leading to improvements in methodology which, in turn, leads to	better	(in terms	of	approximating	truth) theories,	because the methodology	is	no	longer	affected	only	by	or	shaped	according	to	new	theoretical	knowledge.	There	are	other	things	sneaking	in. To	better	understand	what	we	are	dealing	with	here,	let's	take	a	look	at	scientific	methodology.	What	do	we	have	in	mind	when	we	speak	of	a	method? Usually,	a	method	is	a	prescription	telling	how	to	do	something	in	a	certain way	or	by	a	special	procedure.	Thus,	we	can	have	methods	for	almost	every activity,	ranging	from	the	simplest	like	drinking	tea	to	the	most	complex	like building	space	shuttles.	The	relation	between	methods	and	these	activities	is complex:	methods	can	play	different	roles,	from	improving	the	outcome	of an	activity	(either	by	making	it	socially	acceptable,	e.g.	drinking	tea	or	eating in	a	certain	way,	or	by	bringing	the	result	closer	to	one's	wishes)	to	making possible	a	certain	activity	(there	are	complex	and	complicated	activities	that are	impossible	without	a	method	that	tells	exactly	what	to	do	at	each	step	of the	process). A	thing	that	all	methods	have	in	common	is	the	strong	bond	to	some	ends. Every	method	is	specially	designed	for the	realization	of	some	goal,	and	it consists	of	the	set	of	rules	one	has	has	to	follow	in	order	to	reach	that	goal. From this perspective, one can represent	methods as some sort of imperatives: I. M.: You ought to do X, if you aim at Y [where	X	can	be	taken	as	a	set of	rules]. 10 The	principles	Boyd is referring to here are the extra-experimental principles (i.e. those different	from	consistency	with	observational data)	at	work	in	theory	choice. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science458 The	problem	with this representation is that it is too restrictive.	Not	every method	can	be	thought	of	as	a	sort	of	imperative	because	not	every	aim	is	so straightforward	realizable	or	attainable	with	the	help	of	a	method	–	either	because	the	aim	is	too	vague11	(and	not	knowing	exactly	what	you	want	prevents you	from	finding	a	method	that	can	deliver)	or	it	is	too	complicated	(and	it	is no	simple	business	to	find	out	what	you	have	to	do	in	order	to	attain	it).	This leaves	room	for	methods	that	only	improve	the	chances	of	reaching	a	certain goal.	These	methods	are	more	like	guidelines	that	can't	do	more	than	set	one on	what	seems	to	be	the	right	path	towards	the	desired	aim.	Instead	of	a	set	of rules,	these	methods	consist	of	a	set	of	values,	i.e.	things	that	is	desirable	to pursue	given	a	certain	aim.	We	can	understand	these	methods	as	having	this form: G. M.: If you want Y, then you should want X also, because, from what we know, doing X improves the chances of attaining Y [where	X	can	be	taken as	a	set	of	values]. This formulation (especially the "from what we know" part) brings to the forefront another characteristic shared by all methods: the dependence of some	background	knowledge.	The	means	one	finds	for	realizing	certain	aims are	strongly	dependent	on	the	context	in	which	they	are	looked	for,	and	this because,	first	of	all,	methods	can	be	found	(are	possible)	only	if	the	right	context	presents	itself	(e.g.	building	a	space	shuttle	would	have	not	been	possible outside	the	context	of	the	20th	century	science),	and	second,	different	context can	lead	to	different	methods	or	to	improvements	in	existing	ones. Now	it	is	a	good	time	to	return	to	Boyd's	argument.	His	view	on	the	dialectical	relationship	between	scientific	methodology	and	scientific theories	corresponds	broadly	to	what	we	have	just	said	about	the	context	dependency	of methods	in	general.	What	is	missing	from	his	picture	is	the	importance	goals play	in	shaping	a	certain	methodology:	a	methodology	is	not	only	theory-dependent	but	it	is	aim-sensitive	as	well	and	the	slightest	change	in	aim	can	have considerable	effects	on the	associated	method.	So	why	did	Boyd	disregard the	importance	of	aims	in	the	shaping	of	the	scientific	methodology?	I	don't think	he	did.	He	took	the	aim	of	science	as	constant	throughout	history	(as fixed)	–	as	most	realists	do	–	and	so	it	was	just	uninteresting	to	bring	it	into discussion:	what	changes is	only the theoretical	context in	which	scientific methods	are	forged	in	the	struggle	to	strip	the	world	out	of	its	truth.	But	this impression,	i.e.	that	the	same	struggle	(in	terms	of	aim)	dates	back	to	the	beginning	of	science,	is	mistaken	–	it	originates	in	an	idealized	view	on	science that	doesn't take	into	consideration	its	socio-historical	evolution.	Compare, for	example,	Newton's	or	Boyle's	semi-theological	aims	with	the	present-day view	about	what	science	aims	and	should	aim	at.	Do	we	have	the	same	thing? Some	will	say	we	do:	in	both	cases	we	have	as	the	main	aim	the	search	for true	theories	about	the	world	–	everything	else	is	unimportant.	I	disagree,	but I	am	not	going	to	take	the	historical	path	here	and	try	to	provide	examples	in support	of	my	position.	Actually,	that	won't	work	very	well,	because	showing that	throughout	history	scientists	had	different	views	about	the	goal	of	science doesn't	do	much	in	terms	of	assessing	the	impact	(if	any)	these	differences had	on	the	content	of	science.	More	than	that,	someone	can	easily	reply	to such	an	undertaking that,	what the	historian identifies as	different	goals is actually	the	same	goal	(search	for	true	theories	about	the	world)	cosmeticized with	all	kind	of	things	that	are	not	concerned	with	the	content	of	science,	and are	best	treated	under	the	heading	"extrinsic	values". SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science459 A	better	way	to	understand	the	importance	aims	play	(especially	aim	differences	–	even	the	small	and	seemingly	unimportant	ones)	in	the	shaping	of	the content	of	science	is	to	look	at	their	relation	with	the	means	we	normally	use for	attaining	them.	Returning	to	our	previous	talk,	we	can	say	about	methods that	they	are	doubly	dependent:	on	the	knowledge	context	they	are	created	in and	on	the	aim	they	are	meant	to	fulfill.	Depending	on	the	aim	we	can	distinguish	between	imperative methods	and	guideline methods.	Those	methods that	are	known to	deliver the	aim	every time they	are (correctly)	used	can be	dubbed	imperative	methods,	because	the	steps	one	takes	or	the	rules	one follows	in	accordance	with	such	methods	can	be	formulated	as	some	sort	of imperatives.	The	most	important	prerequisite	for	such	methods	is	that	the	aim that	they	are	linked	to	is	clear	(we	have	to	know	exactly	what	we	want	if	we are	to	find	ways	that	can	deliver).	But	not	every	aim	is	this	way.	We	sometimes	have	vague	goals,	i.e.	we	want	things	we	don't	really	know	much	about. This	brings	into	attention	the	second	type	of	methods,	because	the	most	we can	do	when	we	are	on	the	path	towards	an	unknown,	obscure	and	elusive	end is	to	rely	on	something	that	seems	to	capture	all	the	good	characteristics	of what	we	feel	is	the	right	direction. Now,	doesn't	this	talk	about	vague,	obscure,	unknown,	and	elusive	ends	ring a	bell?	Doesn't	it	remind	us	about	the	seemingly	unchanged	goal	of	science: truth	about	the	world	–	this	beast	that	the	methods	of	science	are	supposed	to tame?	For	those	inclined	to	answer	negatively	to	this	question,	I	must	specify that	I'm	not	saying	that	there	isn't	such	a	thing	or	that	it	is	in	principle	an	end we	cannot	reach.	Actually,	I	am	making	the	most	modest	of	claims:	we	are	far from	having	a	clear	picture	about	what	"truth	about	the	world"	amounts	to. As	evidence	for	this	stand	all	the	"good"	past	scientific	theories	that	are	lying now	in	the	scientific	mausoleum.	But	there	is	nothing	here	that	a	scientific realist	will	not	agree	with.	Every	realist	nowadays	will	avoid	taking	scientific theories	as	true	descriptions	of	something	(no	matter	how	much	they	want	to do	that),	because	we	can	no	longer	say	about	a	theory	that	it	offers	us	a	true story	about the	world	without	sounding	ridiculous.	Claiming	that implies	a complete	ignorance	towards	the	history	of	science,	i.e.	to	the	fact	that	all	our past	scientific	theories	have	turned	out	to	be	false,	and	to	Popper's	teachings about	the	fact	that	we	can	never	know	if	a	theory	is	true.	Instead	of	truth,	they use	concepts	as	Popper's	verisimilitude	or	the	concept	of	approximate	truth and interpret past theories as approximately true or see truth as being approached	by	the	increasing	verisimilitude	of	such	theories. Science	aims	at	true	theories	about	the	world,	but	we	have	no	idea	what	that is.	Or	do	we?	Most	realists	will	disagree	with	this	claim:	by	true	theories	about the	world,	we	mean	theories	that	give	us	accurate	accounts	about	the	causal structure	of	the	world.	A	reply	might	be	that	they	are	more	than	that;	they	are theories	that	give	us	knowledge	of	the	intrinsic	natures	of	physical	(observable and	unobservable)	objects.	To	counterpoint,	one	might	say	that	they	are	about the	natural	kinds	of	objects,	properties	and	processes	and	their	real	essences. But	wait,	there	are	no	objects	or	essences	or	any	kind	of	individual	things,	so they	can	only	be	about	the	nomological	structure	of	the	world.	Thus,	which one	is	it?	What	can	we	replace	"the	world"	with	in	the	above	formulation	of 11 Vague	here	doesn't relate in	any	way to the discussion	about	vague	terms	in	the	philosophy	of	language. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science460 the	aim	of	science?	Is	it	the	objects,	the	essences	and	their	kinds,	the	fundamental	laws,	the	causal	structure	or	the	nomological	structure?	Of	course,	it would	be	pure	madness	to	try	to	answer	this	question.	The	point	here	is	that, even	though,	at	first	sight,	"about	the	world"	seems	to	convey	a	precise	and clear	meaning,	is	actually	as	vague	and	obscure	as	it	gets. We	will	say	it	again	then:	science	aims	at	true	theories	about	the	world,	but we	have	no	idea	what	that	is.	We	have	no	idea	what	a	true	theory	will	look like,	and	we	have	no	hope	of finding	such	a thing.	The	most	we	can	hope for is truth-approximations or truth-likeness or verisimilitude or whatever other	substitutes	for	truth	we	prefer	in	order	to	deal	with	all	the	idealizations, approximations,	simplifications	used	in	scientific	theories	and	all	the	errors present	in	the	scientific	practice.	But	truth-substitutes	do	come	with	their	own problems	which	don't	do	us	any	good	when	it	comes	to	having	a	clear	picture about	what	we	are	looking	for	in	science.	But	this	is	not	all.	In	addition,	we have no idea what the "world", that the scientific theories presumably are about,	amounts	to	in	this	context. Thus,	what	science	aims	at	after	all?	Well,	we	could	say	that	science	aims	at something	that	we	know	we	cannot	have	about	something	we	know	nothing about.	I	take	this	to	be	the	real	meaning	of	the	following	phrase:	science	aims to	reveal	the	secrets	of	nature. Let's	get	back	now	to	our	previous	discussion	about	methodology	and	ask ourselves:	what	does	all	this	say	about	what	happens	in	science?	What	kind of	methods	do	we	find	there?	Well,	if	I'm	right	and	science	has	one	of	the vaguest	aims	you	can	find,	then	the	only	kind	of	methods	we	will	find	in science	are	guideline	methods	and	so	the	activity	of	science	would	be	a	lax sort	of	undertaking.	But this strikes	us	as	a	completely	mistaken	picture. Scientific	practice	seems	to	be	replete	with	rules	that	are	part	of	methods for	specific	activities.	Scientists	don't	seem	to	rely	only	on	(or	follow	just) some	guidelines	when	conducting	an	experiment for testing the	outcome predicted	by	some	theory,	for	example,	or	for	measuring	a	certain	quantity – they are following strict rules that guarantee that the outcome of their activity	is	accepted	by	their	(scientific)	community	and	considered	scientific.	But	there	is	no	way	these	rules	could	have	been	forged	in	the	context of a practice with such a vague aim that science presumably has, right? Wrong.	If	all	that	matters	is	what	the	scientific	community	accepts,	i.e.	if we	translate	this	in	terms	of	some	sort	of	social	acceptability,	then	everything	is	possible.	I	am	not	willing	to	take	this	path,	though,	that	is	why	I will reformulate the last	phrase so that it	won't lead	us in that	direction: when	calculating,	making	observations,	conducting	experiments	or	pursuing whatever other activities they are involved in, scientists are obeying rules	designed	to	ensure	the	success	of	their	practice.	A	good	question	here would	be:	what	kind	of	success?	If	not	social	success,	then	what?	A	simple (and	neutral)	answer	would	be	success	in	interacting	in	certain	ways	with certain	specific	aspects	or	our	surroundings.	But	where	do	these	rules	for interacting	with	our	surroundings	come	from?	They	form	imperative	methods that seem unlikely to be generated under the auspices of the aim of science	as	described	above. An	obvious	way	out	here	would	be	to	take	this	problem	as	evidence	that	science	has	another	aim.	"The	search	for	true	theories	about	the	world"	as	the aim	of science is a product of the realist's	wishful thinking	which	doesn't come	even	close	to	what	really	happens	in	science	(as	the	above	discussion seems	to	suggest).	Science	doesn't	aim	at	truth,	it	doesn't	struggle	to	reveal SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science461 the	secrets	of	nature,	but	it's	searching	for	better	ways	of	dealing	(in	terms of	controlling,	transforming,	predicting	its	behavior)	with	our	surroundings. This is a	way	more tractable	goal that fits	better	with the image	projected by	the	scientific	practice	(i.e.	with	the	imperative	methods	that	govern	what seems	to	be	the	main	scientific	activity:	interacting	in	certain	ways	with	our surroundings). I	don't	think	this	is	a	good	escaping	route	from	the	above	difficulty,	though. Actually,	I	don't	think	we	have	a	difficulty	at	all.	The	apparent	tension	between	what	the	goal	of	science	(the	realist	version)	implies	(in	terms	of	methodology), and	what the	practice	of science	presents	us	with	was	generated by	the	fact	that	we	looked	in	the	wrong	place	for	an	assessment.	In	order	to diffuse the tension, it is	sufficient to	acknowledge the	existence	of the	following	rough	divide	between two types	of	scientific	practices: interactionist practices	(making	observations,	experimenting	or	applying	theories),	and theoretic practices	(theory	creation	and	theory	assessment).	The	interactionist practices	are	based	on	and	derive	from	the	theoretical	context	generated	by the	theoretical	practices,	but	the	methods	that	shape	these	practices	shouldn't be	related	to	the	overarching	goal	of	science	but	to	the	theoretical	constraints acting	on	them.	The	overarching	aim	has	a	direct	relation	only	to	the	theoretic part	of	the	scientific	practice.	But	it	is	well	known	that	this	part	is	methodologically	flawed.	Thus,	the	fact	that	the	goal	of	science	is	so	vague,	obscure or	elusive	is	perfectly	compatible	with	the	scientific	practice.	No	tension	here and	no	need	to	search	for	a	more	tractable	goal. Let's	return	to	Boyd	one	final	time.	Why	is	all	this	discussion	about	the	aim of	science	and	its	relation	with	scientific	methodology	and	scientific	practice relevant	for	our	main	objective	in	this	section	(i.e.	to	show	that	Boyd's	argument fails in a context similar to that	of the	capitalization	of	knowledge)? As	we	said	earlier,	in	Boyd's	case,	we	have	a	fixed,	clear,	objective,	not	socially-related,	realist	aim	of	science12	and	some	background	knowledge	that together	represent	the	context	in	which	our	scientific	methodology	is	generated;	methodology	that	leads	to	increasingly	accurate	theories	about	the	world which,	in	turn,	become	background	knowledge	for	a	new	cycle	that	will	get us	even	closer	to	the	truth	(see	fig.	1).	But	as	our	subsequent	discussion	tried to	show,	the	aim	of	science	is	far	from	being	clear	and	fixed.	If	we	can	show that	this	aim	is	socially	related	as	well,	we	have	a	strong	case	against	Boyd, because	we	can	argue	that	the	above	dialectical	process	doesn't	actually	get us	close	to	the	truth. Fig.	1 Is	the	goal	of	science	socially	related?	Not	really,	no.	Even	though	it	doesn't have the	most fortunate	of	aims, it	does	have	a	stable	one:	science tries to 12 Boyd	doesn't	mention	such	a	thing	in	his	argument,	but	I	take	it	as	a	hidden	presupposition	of	it. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science462 reveal the secrets of nature no matter	what social setting is enveloping its practice.	But,	as	our	previous	discussion	about	the	capitalization	of	knowledge	showed,	this	aim	is	sometimes	coupled	with	other,	socially	determined/ relevant,	goals.	In	this	context,	instead	of	aiming	just	at	revealing	the	secrets of	nature,	science	has	a	more	focalized	aim:	not	every	secret	of	nature	will do.	What	our	society	is	requesting	from	science	is	to	unveil	more	of	those	secrets	that	are	useful	in	solving	social	problems	or	that	have	industry/economy boosting	potential.	Now,	the	effects	that	this	coupling	has	on	science	are	not content-related,	and	thus	they	shouldn't	be	given	too	much	epistemological attention. If we look at it from the perspective of our previously sketched relationship	between	aims	and	methods,	we	can	capture	this	remark	in	terms of	the	following	dissociation	between	the	values	that	the	guideline	methods consist	in:	intrinsic values	and	extrinsic values.	We	call	intrinsic	those	values that	are	directly	related	(in	terms	of	contributing	to	attaining	it)	to	the	desired aim.	Extrinsic	values,	on	the	other	hand,	are	those	values	that	do	not	affect	the path	towards	the	aim,	but	that	are	telling	us	how	we	should	take	it	and	what	to do	with	the	results.	In	our	case,	market	competitiveness	and	social	relevance function	as	extrinsic	values	determinators	that	don't	interfere	with	more	important	aspects	of	our	scientific	methodology. Unfortunately,	things	are	far	from	being	that	simple.	There	is	a	problem	that prevents us from following the above reasoning about the epistemological attention	that	socially	determined	scientific	goal	alterations	should	enjoy:	the fact	that	the	goal	of	science	is	so	vague	puts	us	in	difficulty	when	it	comes	to distinguishing	between	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	values.	Remember	that	the	role of	values	in	the	guideline	methods	case	was	to	capture	all	the	good	characteristics	of	what	we	feel	is	the	right	direction	towards	a	desired	aim.	But	finding a	good	path	towards	a	vague	aim	is	not	an	easy	job.	That	is	why	when	we	have a	compound	goal,	vagueness	can	be	taken	as	weakness:	the	less	vague	part	of the	compound	will	have	priority	over	the	rest	in	determining	the	values	that the	methods	should	consist	in.	We	will	always	be	tempted	to	go	(value-wise) towards	the	better	known	end	even	though	is	not	our	main	aim	(especially	in	a context	in	which,	due	to	the	vagueness	of	our	main	aim,	it	is	hard	to	tell	what counts	as	a	deviation	from	the	path	towards	it). We	can	illustrate	this	point	by	looking	at	the	following	example:	If you want market competitive and social relevant knowledge of the world, then you should prefer scientific theories that exhibit the following virtues..., because, from what we know, this kind of values improves the chances of attaining your goal.	The	dots	here	should	be	replaced	with	a	set	of	extrinsic	and intrinsic values	that	compose	our	method	in	this	case.	The	extrinsic	values	will	have	to do	with	those	things	that	ensure	that	our	theoretic	results	have	economic	potential	and	social	relevancy,	and	the	intrinsic	part	with	knowledge.	Consider now	the	following	two	situations: (a) our	scientific	practice	comes	up	with	a	theoretic	result	that	satisfies	in an	evident,	undeniable	fashion	the	extrinsic	values	set	up	for	science by	this	social	setting,	but	doesn't	excels	when	it	comes	to	the	intrinsic part (it	doesn't	conflict	with	any	value,	but is	also	hard to tell if it satisfies	them); (b) we	have	a	theory	that	doesn't	satisfy	classical	intrinsic	methodological	value,	say	simplicity,	but	is	particularly	fruitful	in	technological results (i.e.	we	have	a complex	but technologically / economically fruitful	theory). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science463 What	kind	of	decision	will	presumably	be	taken	in	these	cases?	I	have	strong doubts	that	our	scientific	community	would	decide	to	abandon	either	one	of the	above	theoretical	results.	What	would	determine	such	a	rejection?	In	both cases	we	have	strong	(social)	reasons	to	accept	the	theories	and	we	are	uncertain	about	the	reasons	to	dislike	them	(we	are	far	from	being	sure	that	simplicity,	for	example,	is	such	a	good	right	path	indicator). What	this	suggests	is	that	extrinsic	(socially	related)	values	are	far	from	being epistemologically irrelevant: they	affect in	a straightforward	way	scientific decision	making,	and	so	they	affect	the	very	content	of	science.	This	doesn't amount	to	saying	that	epistemic	values	(truth	/	justification	related	values)	are not	the	main	players	in	scientific	decisions,	but	that	they	can	easily	become compatible	with	other	(possibly	not	epistemologically	innocent)	factors. Thus,	the	goal	of	science	is	partially	but	significantly	socially	related.	Why	is this	a	problem	for	Boyd's	argument?	Because	it	suggests	replacing	his	picture about	the	scientific	dialectical	process	with	the	following	one:	we	have	a	social-historical	context	which	partially	determines	the	aim	of	science,	which	in turn,	together	with	the	available	background	knowledge,	stand	behind	a	methodology	that	is	responsible	for	empirically	and	aim-adequate	theoretical	results	(see	fig.	2).	Progress	towards	truth	is	out	of	the	question	here	because	the methodology	is	no	longer	trustworthy	in	this	respect.	This,	of	course,	leaves us	with	the	problem	of	explaining	the	instrumental	reliability	of	this	methodology.	But	this	shouldn't	bother	us	too	much	and	this	for	two	reasons.	First, there	are	alternative	anti-realist	explanations	to	choose	from.	Second,	if	we are	right	about	these	methods	and	the	scientific	decision	making,	a	truth-involving	realist	explanation	(a	la	Boyd)	will	not	do	anyway	(it	would	be	crazy to	say	that,	even	though	socially	contaminated	as	they	are,	these	methods	can still	contribute	to	"the	overall	reliability	of	the	scientific	practice	with	respect to	the	acceptance	of	theoretical	principles	and	laws	which	are	not	only	predictively	reliable	but	approximately	true	as	well"	(Boyd	1980,	p.	621)). Fig.	2 2.4. Social constructivism... again After	our	long	detour	has	ended,	we	can	return	to	our	previous	aim-related position	formulation	game.	What	would	be	a	proper	thesis	in	this	context?	I think	we	should	go	with	the	following	one: C. K.:	Science aims at market competitive and social relevant knowledge of the world, and acceptance of its theories involves the belief that they are good [in terms of satisfying the aim]. As it stands, this thesis is, of course, not satisfactory. We don't want to (wrongly)	imply	that	social	constructivism	(in	the	clothes	it	wears	here)	is	a SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science464 view	suggested	and	supported	only	by	this	recent	phenomenon	(the	capitalization	of	knowledge).	What	I	have	in	mind	is	that	the	type	of	social	influence on	science	that	this	phenomenon	exhibits	accompanied	science	throughout	its history.	In	Steven	Shapin's	words: "Throughout	history, all sorts	of	universities	have 'served society' in all sorts	of	ways, and, while	market	opportunities	are	relatively	novel,	they	do	not	compromise	academic	freedom	in	a way	that	is	qualitatively	distinct	from	the	religious	and	political	obligations	that	the	ivory	tower universities	of	the	past	owed	to	the	powers	in	their	societies."	(Shapin	2003,	p.	19) The	above	thesis	is	only	a	related	to	the	present	social	and	scientific	contexts expression	of	our	view.	A	complete	picture	will	consist	in	a	list	with	all	such theses that can be obtained from the history of science by replacing what comes	after	"aims	at"	in	C.K.	above.	We	can	resume	this	list	with	the	help of	the	following	thesis	which	can	be	taken	as	the	essential	formulation	of	our position: S.C.: Science aims at some socio-cultural contextual knowledge involving aim, and acceptance of its theories can't[shouldn't] imply more than the belief that they are adequate for [in light of] the contextualized aim. References: Bauchspies,	Wenda;	Restivo, Sal;	Croissant, Jennifer (2006).	Science, Technology, and Society: A Sociological Perspective.	Oxford	–	New	York:	Wiley-Blackwell. Boyd,	Richard	(1980).	Scientific	Realism	and	Naturalistic	Epistemology.	PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980	(2),	pp.	613– 662. doi:	https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1980.2.192615. Boyd,	Richard	(1983).	On	the	Current	Status	of	the	Issue	of	Scientific	Realism.	Erkenntnis 19	(1–3),	pp.	45–90.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00174775. Carnap,	Rudolf	(1959).	The	Elimination	of	Metaphysics	through	Logical	Analysis	of	Language.	In:	Ayer,	Alfred	Jules.	Logical Positivism,	pp.	60–81.	Glencoe,	Ill:	Free	Press. Etzkowitz, Henry (2002). MIT and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science. London: Routledge. Etzkowitz,	Henry	(2008).	The Triple Helix University-Industry-Government Innovation in Action.	London:	Routledge. Feyerabend	(1993).	Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge.	London:	Verso. Finnegan,	Ruth	(ed.	2005). Participating in the Knowledge Society: Research beyond University Walls.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave-Macmillan. Gibbons	et	al	(1994).	The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies.	London	–	Thousand	Oaks	–	New	Delhi:	Sage	Publications. Hempel,	Carl	G.	(1965).	Aspects of Scientific Explanation.	New	York:	The	Free	Press. Knorr-Cetina,	Karin	(1981).	The manufacture of knowledge. An essay on the constructivist and contextual nature of science.	Oxford:	Pergamon	Press. Knorr-Cetina,	Karin	(1993).	Strong	constructivism	–	from	a	sociologist's	point	of	view: A	personal	addendum	to	Sismondo's	paper.	Social studies of science	23	(3),	pp.	555–563. doi:	https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312793023003005. Nelson,	Alan	(1994).	How	could	scientific	facts	be	socially	constructed?.	Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25	(4),	pp.	535–547.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1016/00393681(94)90046-9. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science465 Nowotny,	Helga;	Scott,	Peter;	Gibbons,	Michael	(2001).	Re-thinking science: knowledge and the public in an age of uncertainty.	Oxford/New	York:	Wiley-Blackwell. Putnam,	Hilary	(1990).	Realism with a Human Face.	Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University Press. Scott,	Peter	(ed.	1999).	Higher Education Reformed: Shaping the Future.	London:	Taylor &	Francis. Shapin,	Steven	(2003).	Ivory	Trade.	London Review of Books	25	(17),	pp.	15–19. Slaughter,	Sheila;	Archerd,	Cynthia;	Campbell,	Teresa	I.	D.	(2004).	Boundaries	and	Quandaries:	How	Professors	Negotiate	Market	Relations.	Review of Higher Education	28	(1), pp.	129–165.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1353/rhe.2004.0032. Sörlin,	Sverker,	Vessuri,	Hebe	(eds.	2007).	Knowledge Society vs. Knowledge Economy: Knowledge, Power, and Politics.	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan. Viale,	Riccardo;	Roselli, Fondazione (2010). Introduction:	Anti-cyclic	Triple	Helix. In: Viale,	R.;	Etzkowitz,	H.	(ed.).	The Capitalization of Knowledge: A Triple Helix of University-industry-government,	pp.	1–27.	Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing. Van	Fraassen,	Bas	(1980).	The Scientific Image.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press. Gabriel Tȃrziu Socijalni konstruktivizam i metodologija znanosti Sažetak Znanstvena praksa tip je društvene prakse i svako područje znanje uopćeno manifestira važnu društvenu dimenziju. No treba li se činjenica da znanstvena praksa nastaje suradničkim trudom članova društvene grupe biti povezati s proizvodima takve prakse? U ovom radu nastojim na to pitanje odgovoriti afirmativno. Moja će strategija biti argumentirati da cilj znanosti djelomično određen društveno-povijesnim uvjetima i da taj cilj, uključujući dostupno pozadinsko znanje, stoji iza metodologije odgovorne za empirijski adekvatne na cilj orijentirane teorijske rezultate. Ključne riječi društveni	konstruktivizam,	cilj	znanosti,	znanstveni	realizam,	komercijalizacija	istraživanja,	znanstvena	metodologija Gabriel Tȃrziu Sozialer Konstruktivismus und Methodologie der Wissenschaft Zusammenfassung Wissenschaftliche Praxis ist eine Art sozialer Praxis, und jedes Wissensgebiet manifestiert verallgemeinert eine wichtige gesellschaftliche Dimension. Soll jedoch die Tatsache, dass die wissenschaftliche Praxis durch mitarbeiterisches Bemühen der Mitglieder einer gesellschaftlichen Gruppe entsteht, mit den Produkten einer solchen Praxis in Verbindung stehen? In dieser Arbeit bin ich bestrebt, diese Frage affirmativ zu beantworten. Meine Strategie ist das Argument, dass das Ziel der Wissenschaft partiell von gesellschaftlich-historischen Bedingungen bestimmt wird, und dass dieses Ziel, einschliesslich des verfügbaren Hintergrundwissens, hinter der Methodologie steht, die für empirisch adäquate zielorientierte theoretische Ergebnisse verantwortlich ist. Schlüsselwörter gesellschaftlicher	Konstruktivismus,	Ziel	der	Wissenschaft,	wissenschaftlicher	Realismus,	Kommerzialisierung	der	Forschung,	wissenschaftliche	Methodologie SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466) G.	Tȃrziu, Social Constructivism and Methodology	of	Science466 Gabriel Tȃrziu Constructivisme sociale et méthodologie de la science Résumé La pratique scientifique est un genre de pratique sociale, chaque domaine de la connaissance manifestant de manière générale une importante dimension sociale. Au vue du fait que la pratique scientifique apparaît sur la base d'un commun effort des membres du groupe social, faut-il pour autant l'associer avec les productions de telles pratiques ? Dans ce travail, je m'attache à répondre à cette question par l'affirmative. Ma stratégie s'appuie sur l'argument selon lequel le but de la science, étant partiellement déterminé par des conditions historico-sociales, inclut un savoir accessible en arrière-plan, et est motivé par une méthodologie qui est responsable des résultats empiriques adéquats et de la théorie qui en résulte. Mots-clés constructivisme	sociale,	but	de	la	science,	réalisme	scientifique,	commercialisation	de	la	recherche, méthodologie	scientifique